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 Indirect Network Effects in New Product Growth 
 
Abstract 
Indirect network effects are of prime interest to marketers because they affect 
the growth and takeoff of software availability for, and hardware sales of, a new 
product. While prior work on indirect network effects in the economics and marketing 
literature is valuable, these literatures show two main shortcomings. First, empirical 
analysis of indirect network effects is rare. Second, in contrast to the importance the 
prior literature credits to the chicken-and-egg paradox in these markets, the temporal 
pattern – which leads which? – of indirect network effects remains unstudied. Based 
on empirical evidence of nine markets, this study shows, among others, that: (1) 
indirect network effects, as commonly operationalized by prior literature, are weaker 
than expected from prior literature; (2) in most markets we examined, hardware sales 
leads software availability, while the reverse almost never happens, contradicting 
existing beliefs. These findings are supported by multiple methods, such as takeoff 
and time series analyses, and fit with the histories of the markets we studied. The 
findings have important implications for academia, public policy and management 
practice. To academia, it identifies a need for new, and more relevant, 
conceptualizations of indirect network effects. To public policy, it questions the need 
for intervention in network markets. To management practice, it downplays the 
importance of the availability of a large library of software for hardware technology 
to be successful.  
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Introduction 
“A familiar high-tech variation on an age-old conundrum is stalling acceptance of the much-heralded computer storage medium 
known as DVD-ROM: Which comes first, affordable hardware or a wealth of software? The installed base or the content 
providers?” David Pescovitz in: The Los Angeles Times, July 21, 1997. 
TV sets. CD players. DVD players. Economists regularly claim that such markets exhibit 
indirect network effects1. The expected utility of the primary product – and thereby its sales – 
increases as more complements become available, and this availability of complements2, in turn, 
depends on the installed base of the primary product (Caillaud and Jullien 2003; Church and 
Gandal 1993 and 1996; Cottrell and Koput 1998; Hill 1997; Katz and Shapiro 1994). Prior research 
has typically referred to the primary product, such as a TV set, a CD player and a DVD player, as 
hardware and to the product that complements the primary product, such as programming (TV), 
Compact Discs (CD player), and DVD movies (DVD player), as software (Church and Gandal 
1992b; Ducey and Fratrik 1989; Gandal, Kende and Rob 2000; Gupta, Jain and Sawhney 1999).  
Indirect network effects give rise to the ‘chicken-and-egg’ paradox: consumers wait to 
adopt the hardware until enough software is available and software manufacturers delay releasing 
software until enough consumers have adopted the hardware (Caillaud and Jullien 2003; Gandal 
2002; Gupta, Jain and Sawhney 1999). A recent example is the High-Definition television (HDTV) 
market. The expected utility of HDTV sets to consumers (and therefore HDTV set sales) increases 
the more HD broadcasting becomes available. On the other hand, broadcasters will make more HD 
broadcasting available, as the number of consumers owning a HDTV set increases. For HDTV to 
                                                     
1 The phenomenon of indirect network effects is different from the possible interdependence between hardware sales 
and software sales, such as CD Player sales and CD sales (Bayus 1987; Peterson and Mahajan 1978). 
2 The literature is inconsistent in terminology. Scholars have used the term availability (e.g. Dranove and Gandal 2003; 
LeNagard-Assayag and Manceau 2001), variety (e.g. Church and Gandal 1992a and 1993), or both interchangeably 
(e.g. Basu, Mazumdar and Raj 2003; Frels, Shervani and Srivastava 2003; Gandal, Kende and Rob 2000; Katz and 
Shapiro 1985; Nair, Chintagunta and Dubé 2004), in theory development. Most, if not all, of the empirical studies that 
have used the term variety operationalize this construct through counting the total complements available (e.g. Basu, 
Mazumdar and Raj 2003; Gandal, Kende and Rob 2000; Nair, Chintagunta and Dubé 2004). In the present study, we 
consistently use the term availability, as that corroborates with our measures. 
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succeed, this ‘chicken-and-egg’ paradox must be resolved (Farrell, et al. 1992; Gandal 2002; Pope 
1999). 
In the last two decades, several economists have researched various aspects of indirect 
network effects, including (1) coordination between software and hardware industries (Church and 
Gandal 1992b; Economides and Salop 1992; Farrell, et al. 1992); (2) standard setting (Church and 
Gandal 1992a; Clements 2004; Economides 1989; Katz and Shapiro 1985, 1986a, 1992 and 1994); 
and (3) buyers’ technology adoption decisions (Gandal, Kende and Rob 2000; Saloner and Shepard 
1995; Shy 1996). While most research in the first two streams relates to choice between rival 
incompatible systems, the third studies why consumers adopt a given system (Majumdar and 
Venkataraman 1998). Our study fits within this third research tradition. 
Marketing researchers have only recently started to study indirect network effects (Basu, 
Mazumdar and Raj 2003; Gupta, Jain and Sawhney 1999, LeNagard-Assayag and Manceau 2001; 
Nair, Chintagunta and Dubé 2004), although the discipline has a relatively longer tradition of 
studying direct network effects3 (e.g. Brynjolfson and Kemerer 1996; Majumdar and Venkataraman 
1998; Sun, Xie and Cao 2004; Xie and Sirbu 1995). In addition, some marketing studies focus on 
network effects per se, independently of whether they are direct or indirect (e.g. Shankar and Bayus 
2003; Srinivasan, Lilien and Rangaswamy 2004; Van den Bulte and Stremersch 2004).  
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the prior economics and marketing literature. Table 1 contains all 
empirical papers on indirect network effects and stipulates whether they study demand-side or 
supply-side indirect network effects or both; whether they define indirect network effects from only 
the demand-side, only the supply-side, or both; what the focal dependent and independent variables 
                                                     
3 In direct network effects markets, the utility of the product depends directly on the number of others using the same 
product (Katz and Shapiro 1985). 
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in their inquiry are; whether they use proxies to measure focal constructs; how many markets they 
study; whether they have data from the introduction of the new technology; and which markets they 
study. Table 2 contains a selection of non-empirical papers on indirect network effects. It illustrates 
what the main focus of this prior work is (whether on indirect network effects specifically or on 
network effects per se); what the method is (whether mathematical or conceptual); whether they 
define indirect network effects from only the demand-side, only the supply-side, or both; and which 
focal dependent and independent variables are included. While this prior literature is valuable and 
insightful, it also shows some limitations. 
First, empirical analysis of indirect network effects is rare and, as evidenced by Table 1, 
limited to the study of one, exceptionally two, markets. Of the eighteen empirical studies of indirect 
network effects, seventeen study only one market and only one (Gandal 1995) studies two markets. 
This situation is probably due to a lack of data on both hardware sales and software availability. 
Some authors have even claimed that such data is unavailable (Putsis et al. 1997), whereas others 
(six out of eighteen studies) have used distant proxies, such as the amount of advertising (Gandal, 
Greenstein and Salant 1999). Still other authors have modeled indirect network effects as if they 
were direct network effects (Hartman and Teece 1990; Ohashi 2003; Park 2004; Shankar and Bayus 
2003). Authors often also do not use data from the introduction of the new technology either (rare 
exceptions are Dranove and Gandal (2003) and LeNagard-Assayag and Manceau (2001)), leading 
to potential left-censoring biases. Often, authors also have modeled only one side of indirect 
network effects, most often so the effect of software availability on hardware sales (demand-side 
indirect network effects). Moreover, the literature is diverse and inconsistent as to the definition of 
indirect network effects. Many papers do not even explicitly state a definition of indirect network 
effects, others provide (inexplicitly) multiple definitions (see the variation on the definition of 
indirect network effects in Tables 1 and 2). The literature is also inconsistent as to the empirical 
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models employed (see the list of dependent and independent variables in Table 1). Therefore we 
can conclude that the literature lacks a unifying framework to empirically examine indirect network 
effects.  
Second, while the chicken-and-egg paradox is cited a lot, it is unclear how it is resolved. 
Which comes first, the chicken or the egg? Many business analysts (e.g. Midgette 1997; Tam 2000; 
Yoder 1990; Ziegler 1994, all in the Wall Street Journal) and academics (Bayus 1987; Bucklin and 
Sengupta 1993; Clements 2004; Frels, Shervani and Srivastava 2003; Sengupta 1998) have casually 
observed that a critical mass of software titles is required for hardware sales to take off. Take-off is 
the point of transition between the introduction stage and the growth stage of a growth curve 
(Golder and Tellis 1997). Several academics (e.g. Church and Gandal 1992a) have made similar 
arguments based on theoretical models. However, no one – to our knowledge – has empirically 
examined whether software availability leads hardware sales or not.  
We aim to fill these voids in the present paper. To do so, the present paper examines the 
temporal pattern of indirect network effects across multiple markets using secondary data, based on 
prior theories developed in economics and marketing. To do so, the authors have constructed a 
database, on both hardware sales and software availability, for nine markets, since their inception 
(the appendix contains a detailed description of the data): Black & White Television, Compact 
Disc, CD-ROM, Color Television, DVD, Gameboy, i-Mode, Internet (WWW), and Laserdisc.  
The second section of the paper develops the theoretical background of this study. The third 
section details the data we use. The fourth section presents our empirical analysis. We conclude by 
summarizing the results, presenting the implications and limitations of our study, and discussing 
avenues for further research. 
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Theoretical Background 
The essence of indirect network effects theory is the understanding that software and 
hardware form a system (Chou and Shy 1996; Economides 1989; Katz and Shapiro 1994). As they 
form a system, the supply of software and the demand for hardware may affect each other, 
according to a specific temporal pattern. Both may also be affected by other variables. For instance, 
the supply of software may be affected by the supply of software in previous periods and hardware 
sales may be affected by its price and past hardware sales. We next theorize on all these effects.  
Indirect Network Effects 
The theory of indirect network effects argues that the supply of software and the demand for 
hardware affect each other. The amount of software that is available for a certain technology has a 
positive influence on the utility of the entire hardware-software system to the consumer (Church 
and Gandal 1992a; Katz and Shapiro 1985), which draws ever more new adopters to adopt the new 
hardware (Rogers 1995) and thereby increases hardware sales and the installed base of hardware. In 
turn, the hardware installed base positively affects software companies’ decisions to make software 
titles available (Church and Gandal 1993; Gandal 2002). The more consumers that have adopted 
the hardware product, the larger the market potential for software products for that particular 
hardware product and therefore the larger the impetus for software companies to provide software 
titles for the hardware.  
Our in-depth review of the literature of indirect network effects (see Tables 1 and 2) 
suggests at least three forms of indirect network effects, dependent upon the conditions authors 
have imposed to define them. We call these forms: demand-side indirect network effects, supply-
side indirect network effects and demand- and supply-side indirect network effects. Demand-side 
indirect network effects mean that software availability significantly and positively affects hardware 
utility of an individual consumer and therefore, at the aggregate level, also hardware sales. Supply-
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side indirect network effects imply that hardware installed base significantly and positively affects 
the software provision by software manufacturers and therefore, at the aggregate level, software 
availability. Demand- and supply-side indirect network effects imply that both characteristics exist.  
Temporal Pattern in Indirect Network Effects 
The temporal pattern in indirect network effects is important as it can indicate how the 
chicken-and-egg paradox is resolved. Prior literature has not covered this issue in detail. At the 
same time, academic scholars and business analysts have expressed very different opinions on this 
temporal pattern.  
A first opinion expressed is that, given extensive coordination between hardware and 
software manufacturers, growth of software availability coincides with growth in hardware sales 
(e.g. Katz and Shapiro 1994). Government intervention may coordinate the actions of market 
participants – both software and hardware – to achieve that. The guidelines of the FCC towards 
new broadcasting and radio technologies are an example. Hardware manufacturers may also give 
subsidies, kick-backs, and side payments to software manufacturers to fine-tune software 
availability to the hardware sales evolution. In the extreme, hardware manufacturers may even 
vertically integrate into the software industry. An example is RCA’s ownership of NBC (when 
Color Television was introduced).  
Others have argued that growth in software availability may precede growth of hardware 
sales (Bayus 1987; Bucklin and Sengupta 1993; Clements 2004; Frels, Shervani and Srivastava 
2003; Sengupta 1998). Church and Gandal (1992a) and business analysts (Midgette 1997; Tam 
2000; Yoder 1990; Ziegler 1994) claimed that software availability needs to achieve a critical mass 
in order for hardware to become a viable alternative, and hardware sales can take off.  The reason is 
that consumers need a sign of sufficient software availability, before they start to adopt the 
hardware a mass. Also, software companies may invest in software provision before any marked 
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hardware sales occur. For instance, Microsoft invested in the CD-ROM long before any significant 
sales of CD-ROM hardware occurred. Because the CD-ROM was the first mass market high 
capacity medium that might prove useful in copyright protection, Microsoft envisioned the 
dramatic advantages it might have for software delivery and installation. 
Still other economists (e.g. Dranove and Gandal 2003) have argued that software companies 
may balk at making software available for new hardware that has not yet taken off. In the early 
years of most new technologies, the benefits of the new technology are unclear to the software 
industry. Moreover, different standards may be fighting for dominance, generating even more 
uncertainty for the software industry. The future mass acceptance of the hardware, and therefore the 
future profitability of software for the new technology are highly uncertain. Faced with such 
uncertainty, software companies are unlikely to commit substantial resources to making software 
available for the new hardware, especially if it requires a high upfront lump sum investment (Ducey 
and Fratrik 1989). Software providers may only make such investment after hardware sales have 
taken off and grow rapidly, thus signaling the viability of the new hardware.  
At the same time, a critical mass of consumers that adopt the new hardware may develop 
before a sizeable library of software is available, for several reasons. First, early adopters may like 
the snob appeal of owning new hardware (Tellis, Stremersch and Yin 2003). Second, cascade 
effects may prompt consumers to buy new hardware because of their popularity among “opinion 
leaders” rather than their intrinsic utility (Golder and Tellis 2004). Third, early adopters may create 
their own content (e.g. i-Mode, Internet (WWW), or VCR) after buying the hardware4. Fourth, a 
killer application (a single software application of very high quality and popularity) may be 
                                                     
4 We thank a reviewer for this insight. 
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available, by which a sizeable consumer segment “must own” the hardware, regardless of the sheer 
number of applications available (Frels, Shervani and Srivastava 2003). 
Other Effects 
When one empirically examines indirect network effects, other considerations come into 
play as well, both at the hardware and the software side. At the hardware side, also price of the 
hardware5 and prior hardware sales need to be accounted for. Hardware price will affect the 
affordability of the new technology, which may affect the adoption of the hardware by consumers, 
and thereby future sales (Golder and Tellis 1998). Prior hardware sales may affect future hardware 
sales for several reasons. The most salient reason is probably social contagion, in that past hardware 
adoptions will influence future hardware adoptions, either through learning under uncertainty or 
status considerations (Van den Bulte and Stremersch 2004). But there can be several other reasons 
as well, such as market inertia. 
At the software side, two variables may affect software availability. First, past software 
availability may have an influence on future software availability, though the direction of the 
influence may be, a priori, unclear (Chou and Shy 1996; Church and Gandal 1992a). It may be 
positive, because higher past software availability likely increases the utility of the new hardware, 
thereby increasing the future software sales software providers may expect, consequently 
encouraging them to make more software available (the “network” effect). It may also be negative, 
because higher past software availability yields more intense competition among software 
providers, thereby decreasing the margins software providers can make on their software, 
                                                     
5 One could argue that also software price affects consumers’ utility and thereby hardware sales. While this is valid, 
software prices are in most cases small (or even equal to zero, such as in broadcasting or Internet content), as compared 
to hardware prices. It is also in most cases, more difficult to obtain information on average software price as compared 
to average hardware price. Moreover, variation over time may be less in software price than in hardware price. The 
production of software is likely characterized by high up-front investments and low reproduction costs. Combined with 
intense competition, software prices are likely to be low (Shapiro and Varian 1998). 
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consequently discouraging them from making more software available (the “competition” effect). 
Second, software costs may affect software availability decisions by software providers. High costs 
involved in providing software for a new technology may discourage software provision by 
software companies. 
Data 
This section describes the data collection and the characteristics of the sample. 
Data Collection 
To collect data for the present study, we conducted extensive archival research. The data 
collection took a great deal of time and effort, because for each market we needed data on hardware 
sales (and/or hardware installed base), software availability, and hardware price from the time of 
introduction. As one can see from Table 1, prior empirical research has most often examined the 
effect of software availability on hardware sales to test for demand-side indirect network effects and 
the effect of hardware installed base on software availability to test for supply-side indirect network 
effects. We sought to obtain exactly these variables, rather than any other proxies, as some prior 
scholars have done (again see Table 1).  
We used the following procedure to obtain our data. First, we examined the published 
literature on consumer electronics (e.g. Ducey and Fratrik 1989; Golder and Tellis 1997). Second, 
we examined statistical yearbooks (e.g. the Broadcasting and Cable Yearbook, the TV Factbook, 
the Broadcasting Yearbook, the International TV and Video Almanac, and the CD-ROM directory) 
in the libraries of two large research universities in the U.S. Some of these sources are also 
available electronically, but only for more recent years. Third, we contacted organizations directly 
to assess and access their data archives. Our search led us through approximately 30 public 
institutions and their libraries (e.g., U.N., the U.S. Federal Communications Commission, U.S. 
Senate Committees, recording and broadcasting associations, consumer electronics manufacturers’ 
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associations) and about 20 private companies that are market research companies, media 
consultants, manufacturers or software providers. For instance, NPD – a leading research company 
for marketing and sales information – graciously provided us with hardware sales data and software 
availability data for Gameboy. In addition, we tried to combine different sources to check for 
consistency in the data series.  
Characteristics of the Sample  
For this study, we focused on consumer electronics, because economic and marketing 
researchers claim that this class of products shows substantial indirect network effects (Church and 
Gandal 1993; Ducey and Fratrik 1989; Farrell, et al. 1992; Gupta, Jain and Sawhney 1999).   
While we tried to gather data on all consumer electronics markets post WWII, we were able 
to gather annual data on nine network markets as follows: Black & White Television, CD, CD-
ROM, Color Television, DVD, Gameboy, i-Mode, Internet (WWW), and Laserdisc. The markets 
we have data on vary widely from music to video entertainment and ICT to broadcasting. These 
markets also have the nice feature of being quite diverse in market structure, e.g. in number of 
manufacturers (from one (Nintendo) for Gameboy to many for television sets and Internet 
(WWW)), government involvement (from relatively high in television broadcasting to low in 
Compact Disc or DVD), etc. 
All data are from the U.S., except three, namely Compact Disc, Laserdisc, and i-Mode. CD 
and Laserdisc title availability data were unavailable for the U.S. from their introduction (even after 
many consultations with the industry and leading publishers), but they were available for Compact 
Disc in the U.K. (which is clearly a lead market in music) and for Laserdisc in Japan (which is 
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clearly a lead market in the most popular Laserdisc applications, such as Karaoke).6 I-Mode data 
were not available for the U.S., while it was for the lead market for i-Mode, Japan. 
The precise measures for all our variables and their sources are provided in the Appendix. 
For some markets, we derived hardware installed base from hardware sales by taking the 
cumulative sales, as data on hardware installed base was unavailable. Such derivation assumes 
there are no replacement sales – which is likely in many of our markets as we study the early 
diffusion process – and is in line with prior literature (Clements and Ohashi 2005; Dranove and 
Gandal 2003; Gandal, Kende and Rob 2000; Hartman and Teece 1990; Nair, Chintagunta and Dubé 
2004; Shankar and Bayus 2003).  
Our measures for software availability are consistent with measures other scholars have 
used in the past. For example, Nair, Chintagunta and Dubé (2004) use the number of software titles 
available for different PDA platforms. Basu, Mazumdar and Raj (2003), LeNagard-Assayag and 
Manceau (2001) and Gandal, Kende and Rob (2000) use the number of available Compact Disc 
titles.  
Our measures for hardware prices are the average prices across brands, as is again similar to 
prior literature (LeNagard-Assayag and Manceau 2001; Shankar and Bayus 2003). For three 
markets, our measure for price shows specific limitations. In the Compact Disc market, we were 
unable to obtain hardware prices from the U.K. As we assume the U.K. market has undergone a 
similar CD player price pattern as the U.S. – e.g. because CD player brands are global players with 
global manufacturing capacity that determines their prices – we have included the U.S. CD player 
price as a proxy. In the i-Mode market, we included the average price of i-Mode handsets, which 
                                                     
6 Note that for the CD market, the main problem with data from the U.S. is that the number of released CD’s by 
independent labels is unavailable, which is about 1/3 to 1/4 of the CD market.  
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does not include access fees, for which we could not obtain data. In the Internet (WWW) market, 
we included the average price of a (fax-) modem, as that is the hardware component, and made 
abstraction of the average price of Internet access. 
We display all our data graphically in the results section below (Figure 1), where series 
have been normalized by dividing the values by the maximum value in the series. This 
normalization enables better comparison and graphical conclusions, while also retaining 
confidentiality required to obtain some of the data.  
Empirical Analysis 
One can conceive of two ways in which one can empirically analyze the theoretical 
framework conceived above. First, one can focus on the concept of takeoff and contrast takeoff of 
hardware sales with takeoff of software availability. Second, one can conceptualize a time series 
model, based upon the notion of Granger causality. We apply both techniques and discuss each in 
turn. We end with relating our findings to the historical industry development, lending further 
credence to the pattern we found. 
Takeoff Analysis 
This section explores takeoff in indirect network effects markets. It first derives the concept 
of takeoff and develops its usefulness in empirically examining the theory derived above. Then it 
presents the measurement of takeoff, after which it turns to our findings. 
Conceptual  
Initially, sales of a new product are generally flat. After some time, a critical mass7 of 
adopters may develop, causing sales to show a distinct takeoff (Golder and Tellis 1997; Rohlfs 
                                                     
7 Threshold and critical mass are terms that are used interchangeably in the sociology and economics literatures (Witt 
1997, Macy 1991). For clarity, we consistently use the term critical mass. 
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2001; Shapiro and Varian 1998). The concept of critical mass was born in physics, where it refers 
to the point of no return, after which nuclear fusion becomes self-sustaining, and it has 
subsequently been adopted in sociology, where it refers to the minimum level of activity needed to 
make an activity self-sustaining (Schelling 1978). Thus, new product takeoff is followed by rapid 
self-sustaining growth, in which additional consumers adopt the new technology, until the market is 
saturated and sales show a decline (Golder and Tellis 2004). Hardware sales takeoff has been 
recognized as an important phenomenon in the marketing literature (Agarwal and Bayus 2002; 
Golder and Tellis 1997; Tellis, Stremersch, and Yin 2003).  
Scholars have argued that the critical mass concept – and thus by consequence, takeoff – is 
pronounced in markets that are strongly influenced by interdependence of players – as is the case in 
system markets (Andreozzi 2004; Granovetter 1978; Valente 1995). This fits diffusion literature in 
marketing that has found that diffusion curves are more pronouncedly S-shaped in markets with 
competing standards (Van den Bulte 2000; Van den Bulte and Stremersch 2004).  
In markets with direct network effects, the utility of the product to consumers depends upon 
the number of prior adopters. Thus, the critical mass is a certain number of adopters (Katz and 
Shapiro 1986a). In markets with indirect network effects, there is interdependence, between the 
utility an adopter derives from the system, and the number of other adopters of the system, because 
of the availability of complementary products (Katz and Shapiro 1986a; Srinivasan, Lilien and 
Rangaswamy 2004). Thus, markets with indirect network effects exhibit critical mass not only in 
consumer adoption of hardware (i.e., the demand side), but also in the amount of available software 
(i.e., the supply side). Therefore, software availability may show a pattern similar to hardware 
sales. At first, software companies may balk at providing software, because they doubt the viability 
of the new technology. After some time, a critical mass of software availability may develop and 
software availability will show a distinct takeoff. Prior business analysts (e.g. Midgette 1997; Tam 
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2000; Yoder 1990; Ziegler 1994) and academics (e.g. Church and Gandal 1992a) have made 
reference to such phenomenon without examining it in depth.  
The takeoff in both hardware sales and software availability are important events in indirect 
network effects markets in view of the “chicken-and-egg” paradox. The order of takeoff of 
hardware sales and software availability may provide insight into the temporal pattern of indirect 
network effects. As we stipulated in our theoretical framework, prior theory is ex ante 
indeterminate as to what the temporal pattern may be, or in popular terms, what comes first: the 
chicken or the egg? The empirical study of the temporal order in which takeoff of software 
availability and hardware sales occur may provide a preliminary answer.  
Measurement 
Most prior research has identified takeoff using a heuristic, much like the rules used by 
Golder and Tellis (1997), Stremersch and Tellis (2004), and Tellis, Stremersch and Yin (2003) (for 
the only exception, see Agarwal and Bayus (2002)). The spirit of these rules was to call takeoff the 
first time hardware sales crossed a boundary growth percentage, taking into account the base sales 
(past sales, as in Golder and Tellis (1997) or penetration, as in Stremersch and Tellis (2004) and 
Tellis, Stremersch and Yin (2003)). The reason is that growth of 400% is not that significant when 
it entails unit sales growth from 100 to 500 units, while it is when it entails unit sales growth from 
50,000 to 250,000.  
There are two issues we face in applying these rules to our data that encompass hardware 
sales as well as software availability. First, there is no natural base against which to benchmark 
growth of software availability. For instance, 10,000 i-Mode sites may actually be very high, while 
10,000 Internet hosts may be extremely low. Second, we have no prior guidance whether the 
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growth percentages set forth by these prior studies actually make sense for software availability, as 
they were developed as heuristics for consumer durable sales. 
We define takeoff of hardware sales as the year in which the ratio of change in the growth 
of sales relative to base sales reaches its maximum before the inflection point in hardware sales. To 
clarify, change in sales growth is akin to acceleration in sales and is equal to the second difference 
in sales. Thus, takeoff is the year in which the ratio of the second difference in hardware sales to 
hardware sales itself is at its maximum. Note that this rule is similar in spirit to the rule provided in 
the appendix of Golder and Tellis (1997). We define takeoff in software availability, analogously, 
as the year in which the ratio of change in the growth of software availability relative to base 
software availability reaches its maximum before the inflection point in software availability. 
Earlier studies on takeoff contain four of our nine series on hardware sales. Our 
identification of the year of takeoff is identical or very similar to that of prior studies in three cases 
out of four (for CD player sales identical to Tellis, Stremersch and Yin (2003); for CD-ROM sales 
identical to Golder and Tellis (1997) and for Black & White Television Set sales 1 year earlier than 
Golder and Tellis (1997)). These results provide face validity to our method.  For Color Television 
Set sales, our identification of takeoff is 6 years earlier than that of Golder and Tellis (1997). These 
earlier studies also found that takeoff identified through their heuristic coincided with that from 
visual inspection in more than 90% of the cases. In our case, the heuristic rule for takeoff matches 
with visual inspection in all cases (see Figure 1). 
Findings 
Table 3 provides an overview of the takeoff in all markets, while Figure 1 displays them 
graphically. Comparing columns 4 and 7 of Table 3 and the arrows in Figure 1, shows that for five 
out of nine markets (Black & White TV, Compact Disc, i-Mode, Internet (WWW), and Laserdisc), 
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hardware sales take off before software availability does. For three out of nine markets (Color TV, 
DVD, and Gameboy), hardware sales take off at the same time as software availability does. For 
one market out of nine (CD-ROM), hardware sales take off after software availability has taken off. 
Table 3 also shows in columns 5 and 8 the amount of available software when hardware sales took 
off and the level of hardware sales when software availability took off.  
We can conclude that, for the nine markets we examined, hardware sales takeoff leads or 
coincides with software availability takeoff (except in the case of CD-ROM). Moreover, Table 3 
shows that hardware sales can take off at very low levels of software availability. For instance, we 
find that sales of television sets took off with only 7 stations on air. This level is very low compared 
to over a 1,000 TV stations today. It is also low compared to the 2,000+ radio stations in 1947 (the 
year of takeoff for Black & White TV sets). Color TV took off with even remarkably less software 
– again admittedly judgmental – namely 560 hours a year broadcast in color for the entire United 
States. 
However, the analysis of takeoffs provides only a limited picture on indirect network effects 
in these markets for several reasons. First, even though we find a clear temporal pattern between 
takeoffs, it does not prove that indirect network effects actually exist in these markets. Second, one 
has to be cautious regarding the temporal pattern we find. As our and prior research shows (e.g. 
Tellis, Stremersch and Yin 2003), uncertainty of several years may surround identification of 
takeoff. Thus, a difference of one year between the takeoff in hardware sales and the takeoff in 
software availability is statistically not very meaningful. Third, while drops in hardware price seem 
to coincide with takeoff in hardware sales (similar to Golder and Tellis 1997), our takeoff analysis 
is a pure bivariate exercise into the temporal pattern of takeoffs. Given all these limitations, our 
takeoff analysis should be interpreted with caution. To address these limitations, we next develop a 
more sophisticated econometric time series model to examine indirect network effects. This time 
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series analysis provides other benefits. It allows us to examine the temporal pattern of indirect 
network effects, while taking the entire history of a market into account, rather than merely one 
point that is takeoff. Also, it allows us to include other variables that may affect hardware sales, 
such as past hardware sales and hardware price.   
Time Series Analysis 
This section develops a time series analysis to examine indirect network effects and its 
temporal pattern. It first conceptualizes the modeling framework, after which it turns to the model 
specification. It then presents the findings from estimating the model and discusses some further 
analyses we conducted. 
Conceptual 
If one wishes to empirically examine the temporal pattern in indirect network effects with 
aggregate-level secondary data, several considerations should guide the model specification.  
First, as we test the model on actual, aggregate-level market data, we need to make some 
further simplifications to the theory. We do not have data on consumer utility, because such data 
can only be obtained through experiments, surveys or panels. We also do not have data on the 
profits software companies expect. Such data would be hard to gather using any empirical 
methodology. Regarding price, one often has data on only the hardware price and not on the 
software price. Software price is often complex and thus it is difficult to obtain reliable software 
price information. Yet, it is often of minor importance and its omission may not seriously 
compromise conclusions of the model. We also do not have information on software costs, because 
it is proprietary to software firms. Thus, the empirical model one would wish to specify to 
empirically examine indirect network effects on secondary data reduces to the model in Figure 2. 
This model assumes – rather than tests – that the influence of software availability and hardware 
price on hardware sales occurs through consumers’ utility considerations, while it also assumes – 
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rather than tests – that the influence of past hardware installed base and past software availability 
on future software availability occurs through software providers’ profit considerations. In addition, 
it makes abstraction of both software costs and software prices. 
Second, given our interest in the temporal pattern of indirect network effects, we wish to 
refer to the notion of Granger causality (Granger 1969). A process xt is said to Granger cause a 
process yt if future values of yt can be better predicted using both the past values of process xt and 
process yt, than merely the past values of the process yt. Or in mathematical formulation, one says 
that xt does not Granger cause yt if: 
f (yt| yt-1,xt-1) = f (yt|yt-1)       (1) 
In such case, lagged values of xt do not add any information to the explanation of the 
movements in yt, beyond the past of yt itself. The principle of Granger causality rests on the extent 
to which a process xt is leading a process yt. To include this notion of Granger causality in our 
model specification, we lag all independent variables in our models. 
Third, one may expect (see Figure 1) non-linearities. Therefore, we should use a log 
transformation to linearize the model in most, if not all, cases.  
Fourth, our model is a growth model and thus as time passes, one may expect that the 
processes we study may approach a certain maximum value (Franses 1998). For this reason, our 
model also needs to capture a non-linear trend, which we can easily obtain by including a linear 
trend in log-transformed data. Prior network effects models also include a trend (e.g. Basu, 
Mazumdar and Raj 2003; Gandal 1994; Shy 2001). We next formally specify our model based on 
these considerations.  
Model 
We specify the following model:  
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1 1 1log( ) * log( ) * log( ) * log( ) *
H H S H
t t t t tS S A P tα β γ ρ δ ε− − −= + + + + +  (2) 
1 1log( ) * log( ) * log( ) *
S S H
t t t tA A IB tυ λ η τ ζ− −= + + + +     (3) 
In which: HtS is hardware sales at time t, StA is software availability at time t, HtP is price 
of the hardware at time t, HtIB is hardware installed base at time t, α and υ are intercepts, while δ 
and τ capture the time trend. This model specification is a flexible time series model, which we 
estimate for each market separately, using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR).  
Findings 
Table 4 shows the results from estimating equations (2) and (3). The fit statistics for all 
models are satisfactory. The adjusted R2 ranges from 0.75 to 0.99. The models also seem to behave 
well, because there is only one effect that seems implausible, namely the negative coefficient for 
past software availability on future hardware sales, in the Gameboy market. We next discuss the 
results. 
Theoretically, the most interesting result is that we find that past hardware installed base 
significantly and positively affects – “leads” in Granger terminology – future software availability 
in 5 of the 9 markets we examined: Black & White TV, Compact Disc, Gameboy, Internet 
(WWW), and Laserdisc. Only one of these markets shows the presence of both demand- and 
supply-side indirect network effects: Compact Disc. None of the markets we study show only 
demand-side indirect network effects. This result also allows to conclude that – based on the 
operationalization of indirect network effects commonly used in the literature and applied in our 
model through the quantity of available software – demand-and supply-side indirect network effects 
are less pervasive in the markets we examined than commonly assumed. We graphically represent 
our results in Figure 3. 
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These results are consistent with our earlier findings on takeoff. Of the five markets in 
which we found supply-side indirect network effects – in Granger’s terminology, in which 
hardware installed base “leads” software availability – four (Black & White TV, Compact Disc, 
Internet (WWW), and Laserdisc) show an earlier takeoff of hardware sales than of software 
availability. On the other hand, in markets where the time series analysis did not show evidence of 
indirect network effects, the pattern is diverse: the takeoff of hardware sales of CD-ROM lagged 
the takeoff of CD-ROM software availability; the takeoff of hardware sales and the takeoff of 
software availability coincided in the cases of Color TV and DVD; the takeoff of hardware sales 
preceded the takeoff in software availability in one case, i-Mode. 
We next discuss the effects of the other variables we included. As one would expect, many 
– Black&White TV, Compact Disc, Color TV, Gameboy, Internet (WWW) and Laserdisc – of our 
markets show a positive influence of past hardware sales on future hardware sales, either due to 
contagion or other effects, such as inertia. Contrary to what one would expect hardware price does 
not play a major role in hardware sales growth. However, prior research has presented similar 
findings (Bayus, Kang and Agarwal 2006). The explanation for these results may be that in many of 
the markets we study, hardware price is generally not prohibitive. The average hardware price for 
the markets we study, at introduction, was $570. Probably, when one considers more expensive 
devices the impact of price will be more pronounced. Finally, we find that in two markets (CD-
ROM, and DVD) the effect of past software availability on future software availability is positive 
and significant, consistent with the “network” effect hypothesis. In the other markets, the 
coefficient is not significant, either because past software availability does not affect future 
software availability, or because past software availability affects future software availability both 
positively (the “network” effect) and negatively (the “competition” effect), or because past software 
availability affects future software availability in a much more complex pattern than we modeled. 
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Further Analyses 
We conducted several other analyses to see how changes to the model may affect our 
conclusions.  
First, one could claim that it would be better to work in first differences. However, 
econometric theory cannot offer clarity whether this approach is appropriate in our case, as 
conducting unit root tests is not informative given the limited number of data points (Elliott, 
Rothenberg, and Stock 1996; Franses 1998). The estimates for the lagged terms of the models in 
equations (2) and (3) (see Table 4) suggest that differencing may be inappropriate. The reason is 
that these estimates are far from 1, while differencing would impose these parameters to be equal to 
1. Prior authors in the indirect network effects literature typically do not difference either, with the 
exception of Gandal, Kende and Rob (2000), who use it to check the robustness of their model. 
Nonetheless, we decided to conduct these analyses and compare the estimates with our own from 
estimating the model in equations (2) and (3).  
Our findings were the following. First, we found weaker (= insignificant or negative) 
evidence of indirect network effects, for supply-side indirect network effects in the case of Black & 
White TV and Internet (WWW), for demand-side indirect network effects in the case of Compact 
Disc player. We found stronger evidence of indirect network effects, for supply-side indirect 
network effects in the case of Color TV and for demand-side indirect network effects in the case of 
CD-ROM. Second, we found many effects to be implausible. We found one additional case 
(Compact Disc) in which indirect network effects were found to be negative and two cases (CD-
ROM and Internet (WWW)) in which past hardware sales growth has a negative effect on future 
hardware sales growth. These findings hint that working in first differences is inappropriate.   
Second, we conducted many checks common in time series analysis. As Franses (2005) 
would categorize our model as a descriptive model, we focused our diagnostic tests on residual 
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autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, and omitted variables. These tests revealed relatively few 
problems, considering the complexity of our model and the small number of observations. Thus, 
none of these tests revealed a need for revisions to our model specification. 
Historical Industry Analysis 
We next describe each market historically, as it relates to our findings. 
Compact Disc. We found strong demand- and supply-side indirect network effects in the 
Compact Disc market. This market has also been empirically examined the most. Our findings are 
in line with prior findings. LeNagard-Assayag and Manceau (2001) find that software availability 
has a positive and significant effect on the consumer’s utility, and the hardware installed base has a 
positive and significant effect on software availability. Basu, Mazumdar and Raj (2003) find that 
software availability has a significant positive effect on hardware prices. Gandal, Kende and Rob 
(2000) find that software availability has a positive and significant effect on hardware sales and 
hardware sales have a positive (but not significant) effect on software availability.  
Black & White TV. We found – both in the takeoff and the time series analysis – that in this 
market hardware leads software. The reason for these effects may lie in the massive investments 
involved in starting a TV station. It required large outside revenue during the initial years of 
massive losses. Therefore, many of the early stations were owned by television set manufacturers 
(e.g. GE and RCA). The revenues they used to sponsor these early TV stations were generated by 
sales of TV sets (Sterling and Kittross 2002). Therefore, the significant and positive effect of 
hardware installed base on software availability need not come as a surprise. On the other hand, the 
sales of TV sets was not much affected by the quantity of software available (as evidenced by the 
results of our time series analysis), but rather by the technological appeal of television. Television 
was such a revolutionary new product, that families gave their new TV set a dominant location in 
  23
their living room and for the first couple of weeks, all members of the family marveled at the 
phenomenon (Sterling and Kittross 2002). 
Gameboy. We found that in the Gameboy market hardware leads – though the takeoff 
analysis shows simultaneous takeoffs in hardware sales and software availability, the time series 
analysis shows that past hardware installed base positively affects future software availability – and 
positively affects software availability. Independent software providers respond strongly to the 
adoption of hardware (Nair, Chintagunta and Dubé 2004), as was the case with Gameboy. 
Therefore, our finding that availability of Gameboy games grew as more consumers had adopted 
the Gameboy seems logical. However, why did consumers not react to a growing catalog of 
Gameboy games? The answer: TETRIS! Tetris is considered to have been a killer application for 
the Gameboy (Allen 2003; Rowe 1999). Tens of millions of copies of Tetris have been sold since it 
was introduced simultaneously with the introduction of the Gameboy. It was often bundled with the 
Gameboy hardware itself. Thus, rather than the evolution in the full catalog of titles available for 
Gameboy, the availability of one game, Tetris, fueled Gameboy growth. 
Internet (WWW). We found – both in the takeoff and the time series analysis – that in the 
Internet (WWW) market hardware leads software. Again these findings seem logical when one 
considers the industry evolution. First, Internet users can easily become a software provider by the 
provision of on-line content (e.g. web pages). Therefore, a growing installed base of users will 
automatically also lead to a growing base of software providers and thus more Internet hosts (e.g. 
web servers providing web pages). On the other hand, why do we not find that Internet content 
stimulates growth in Internet (WWW) adoption? In the first year, the World Wide Web (WWW) 
already had 80,000 hosts that provided millions of web pages to consumers, more than a single 
human can possibly read in a lifetime. Also, people used Internet also for other types of 
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communication. E-mail predated the birth of the World Wide Web (WWW) and was already a very 
important application right at the start of the World Wide Web (WWW). 
Laserdisc.  We found – both in the takeoff and the time series analysis – that in the 
Laserdisc market hardware leads software. The reason may be very similar to the history of the 
Black & White TV. The most important provider of Laserdisc titles was the leading manufacturer 
of Laserdisc players (Pioneer), because Laserdisc publishing entailed a substantial start-up 
investment (McClure 1992, 1993a and 1993b; McGowan 1994). Pioneer used hardware sales as a 
measure for how strong or weak the Laserdisc market was, and accordingly, released a fitting 
number of titles on Laserdisc. Therefore, we find that past hardware installed base positively affects 
future software availability. On the other hand, the number of titles available does not affect future 
hardware sales. This is most likely because most Laserdisc titles released in the 1980s (the time 
period we study) are not very different from their VHS counterpart, lacking digital sound, 
widescreen, and extra’s (Dick 1990). The provision of such titles did not provide would-be 
Laserdisc owners with an opportunity to exploit Laserdisc players to their fullest potential. Thus, it 
gave would-be consumers little reason to purchase a Laserdisc player. Until 1993, Laserdisc titles 
could only be bought and could not be rented (McClure 1993a), which also made consumers less 
likely to react to an increase in title availability. 
 CD-ROM. We find no evidence of a significant relationship between software availability 
and hardware sales in the CD-ROM market. We also find that it is the only market where software 
availability takes off before hardware sales take off. These findings are in line with the historical 
development of the CD-ROM market. The early support of Microsoft for the CD-ROM is well-
known and the outcry of Bill Gates “I have no idea what the future will bring for the CD-ROM, but 
I am willing to invest 1 billion dollars just to find out!” is notorious. Microsoft also hosted the first 
CD-ROM conferences and developed networks with other content and software providers to write 
  25
for the CD-ROM medium. Microsoft did all this, before a substantial hardware installed base 
developed. On the other hand, the evolution in hardware sales has been independent from that of 
software availability, probably due to technological compatibility issues. The first Multimedia PC 
specifications were only announced at the start of the 1990s – CD-ROM was introduced in 1985 – 
which also set a standard for connecting CD-ROM drives to IBM-compatible PC’s. That eased 
customers’ fears about incompatibility. After years of anticipation, the CD-ROM was finally 
making its way into the home (Alpert 1992). 
Color Television. We find no evidence of a significant relationship between software 
availability and hardware sales in the Color TV market. There may be two major reasons for this 
result. First, during the first ten years of color broadcasting, NBC was the only vivid supporter of 
color broadcasting among the major networks. In 1961, CBS and ABC provided their viewers with 
zero hours of color broadcasting (Ducey and Fratrik 1989). In 1964, NBC would still deliver 95% 
of all color broadcasting (Ducey and Fratrik 1989). Because NBC was the only supporter among 
the main national broadcasters, expansion in color broadcasting (by NBC alone) may not have had 
a major effect on consumers. Second, networks had to invest a massive 30 to 40 million dollars 
(1960 dollars!) to purchase the required color equipment, which still excluded additional 
investments in new graphics, costumes, sets and so on, that were needed as well when going color 
(Sterling and Kittross 2002). On the other hand, broadcasters did not perceive a major upside of 
Color TV that would match this massive investment. Broadcasters, such as ABC and CBS did not 
expect it to expand the installed base of viewers or increase the number of hours viewers watched 
television. Therefore, there was little incentive to react to growing Color TV set sales, with more 
color broadcasting, even more as the technology was backward compatible. It was only when the 
majority of advertising was recorded in color that broadcasters started to invest a mass in color 
broadcasting equipment (Sterling and Kittross 2002). 
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DVD. Also for DVD we found no evidence of a significant relationship between software 
availability and hardware sales. The DVD market has previously been empirically examined by 
Dranove and Gandal (2003). They use two proxies for software availability in the DVD market: 1) 
when a particular studio committed to releasing movies on DVD, and 2) the percentage of US box-
office top 100 movies released on DVD. Only one (percentage of US box-office top 100 films 
released on DVD) of the two proxies has a positive and significant effect on hardware sales. Thus, 
the reason why we do not find significant demand-side indirect network effects may be due to the 
killer application phenomenon cited earlier when we discussed Gameboy history. Consumers may 
only care about the top titles and on which format they appear, rather than the entire catalog of 
movies supporting a format. The reason why we do not find supply-side indirect network effects 
may be due to the immense and early support the DVD technology received from the movie studios 
(Gandal 2002). Within 18 months after the introduction of the DVD format, all the major movie 
studios had adopted the DVD format (Dranove and Gandal 2003) and additional hardware sales 
therefore had no longer any impact on the major movie studios decision to adopt the new DVD 
technology, making the supply of software largely independent of hardware sales.  
i-Mode. Also for i-Mode, we do not find any demand- or supply-side indirect network 
effects. NTT DoCoMo the parent of i-Mode, positioned i-Mode as essentially an extension of pre-
existing mobile phone services (Ratliff 2002); this may well have contributed to the fact that 
consumers do not seem to react to increases in the availability of i-Mode services. New hardware 
characteristics like a built-in camera, and i-Mode’s “always on” feature, may have been the main 
divers behind hardware sales, rather than the total number of i-Mode sites. i-Mode uses C-HTML 
(Compact Hyper-Text Markup Language), a form of HTML with a reduced instruction set, which 
eases the transition for content providers from their already existing HTML web sites to i-Mode-
ready content (Ratliff 2002). This low barrier to entry makes is very easy and relatively profitable 
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for content providers to render their services on i-Mode handsets. With the required up-front 
investment to provide i-Mode services being so small, service providers require only a small 
number of i-Mode users to turn a profit. This fact may make their decision to provide i-Mode 
services largely independent of hardware adoption by consumers. 
Discussion 
 This section summarizes our findings and discusses their implications and limitations.  
Summary of Findings 
This study has two main findings. First, we find that indirect network effects as commonly 
operationalized are less pervasive in the examined markets than expected on the basis of prior 
literature. This finding contrasts sharply with the “current wisdom”, that the amount of available 
software is of critical importance to hardware sales growth (e.g. Church and Gandal 1992a; Gupta, 
Jain and Sawhney 1999; Katz and Shapiro 1986a and 1994).  
Second, in most of the markets we examined, hardware sales lead software availability, 
while the reverse almost never happens. These findings illuminate the temporal pattern of indirect 
network effects, underlying the chicken-and-egg paradox, which was never empirically examined 
before. They contradict the widely held view that software availability should lead hardware sales 
(Bayus 1987; Bucklin and Sengupta 1993; Clements 2004; Frels, Shervani and Srivastava 2003; 
Midgette 1997; Sengupta 1998; Tam 2000; Yoder 1990; Ziegler 1994).  
While there may be many reasons underlying our results – including sampling issues and 
method artifacts – the most credible, given the variation in the markets examined and the 
consistency of our findings across methods (takeoff – time series – historical case detail), is that a 
considerable segment of consumers makes decisions to buy hardware relatively independently of 
the quantity of software that is available. Thus a critical mass of hardware adopters may gather 
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before a critical mass of software titles is available. One probable reason may be the snob appeal of 
owning new hardware (Tellis, Stremersch and Yin 2003). Other reasons may be cascade effects that 
prompt consumers to buy new hardware because of their popularity rather than their intrinsic utility 
(Golder and Tellis 2004) or the fact that users can create their own content after buying the 
hardware. It may also be that a killer application is available, by which a sizeable consumer 
segment must own the hardware, regardless of the sheer number of applications available (Frels, 
Shervani and Srivastava 2003; Williams 2002). 
Implications  
To firms, the most important implication is that hardware manufacturers should not 
overstate the importance of software quantity. Rather, hardware manufacturers should take their 
fate into their own hands and produce high quality technology with a few (not necessarily many) 
exciting applications, rather than aiming for very wide availability of a huge library of software. 
For instance, our results contradict previous calls for hardware manufacturers to pay a lot (in the 
form of kickbacks and subsidies) to get software companies to provide a huge library of titles. 
To public policy, our study is relevant towards government intervention in indirect network 
effects markets. Often, governments or public institutions are under pressure to intervene in indirect 
network effects markets to improve coordination between hardware and software companies. 
Critics claim that the lack of coordination especially in terms of availability of software can slow 
down the takeoff of the new technology. This claim is hard to maintain in view of our findings. In 
contrast, we find that in many markets, hardware sales take off before software availability does 
and, in some markets, at very limited quantities of available software. We also found in our time 
series that hardware sales mostly lead software availability, instead of software availability leading 
hardware installed base. Therefore, an important argument for government intervention fades. On 
the other hand, if intervention were necessary, it might take the form of subsidizing the cost of new 
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hardware. While such subsidies may not be reasonable for entertainment products, they might be 
appealing for products with social benefits, such as electric or hydrogen powered cars. 
To academics, the weak evidence we found – using traditional operationalizations of 
indirect network effects, based on a very long tradition in economics (Church and Gandal 1992a 
and 1992b; Gandal, Kende and Rob 2000) – fits into new conceptualizations of indirect network 
effects that may prove more powerful. A first conceptualization is to examine software quality, 
rather than quantity. Our case detail already illustrated that in some cases (e.g. Tetris in the case of 
Gameboy), quantity does not matter, but the presence of killer applications does. There is very little 
scholarly research that examines the role of killer applications, while the phenomenon is deemed 
very important, especially in certain industries, such as the video game console market. A second 
conceptualization may revolve around the notion that network effects may be more restricted in 
scope than previously assumed (Tucker 2006). As such, the entire catalog of software may not be 
relevant to consumers, but only a very small selection of it may be (e.g. a genre). A third 
conceptualization may revolve around the notion of thresholds. Software availability may need to 
cross a threshold at introduction to make the technology credible. Research that extends indirect 
network effects in these directions may be very impactful. 
Limitations  
This paper examines a complex phenomenon in an area in which data are very scarce. It is 
easy to point at its limitations, which we hope future research will address.  
First, due to data limitations, we could not include other important explanatory variables, 
such as software price, software costs, software and hardware entry, nor could we address possible 
threshold effects (also see Bayus 1987). We were also unable to test the underlying theoretical 
mechanisms – consumers’ utility considerations and software providers’ profitability considerations 
– of our model.   
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Second, we study only nine network markets. Although this is a relatively small sample, it 
compares favorably with prior studies in this area that examined only one or two markets.  
Third, we study only surviving technologies. Future research that studies the role of indirect 
network effects in new technology failure would be interesting.  
Fourth, we focused on countries that can generally be considered lead countries in the given 
technology. It would be interesting to examine if uncertainty from indirect network effects is lower 
in lag countries than in lead countries. Research that focuses on indirect network effects in an 
international setting would be most fruitful. 
Fifth, the role of consumer expectations is of great importance in indirect network effects 
markets. However, it is not included in our model due to data limitations. Incorporating consumer 
expectations in future models may provide new insights. 
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Table 1:  
Overview of Empirical Literature on Indirect Network Effects 
 
 
* C: Compatibility, CD: Consumer Demand, CR: Complementor Response, HIB: Hardware Installed base, HMS: Hardware Market Share, HP: Hardware Price, HS: Hardware Sales, RA: Resource 
Allocation, SA: Software Availability, SD: Software Deployment SP: Software Price. 
 
Demand or 
Supply-side  
Definition of Indirect Network Effects Dependent Variable Independent Variable  Nr. of 
Markets 
Data from 
introduction? 
 
 
Demand-
side 
Supply
-side 
Both Other In HW* 
equation 
In SW* 
equation 
In HW* 
equation 
In SW* 
equation 
Uses 
Proxies 
  
Markets 
Basu, Mazumdar and Raj (2003) Demand V    HP  SA  No 1 No CD 
Clements and Ohashi (2005) Both   V  HMS SA SA HIB No 1 Partial Video Game 
Cottrell and Koput (1998) Demand   V  HP  HMS, SA  No 1 No Microcomputer 
Dranove and Gandal (2003) Demand   V  HS  SA  Yes 1 Yes DVD Player 
Frels, Shervani and Srivastava 
(2003) 
Demand V    RA  SA  No 1 No Computer 
Gandal (1995) Demand   V   SP  C No 2 No Spreadsheet and DMS 
Gandal, Greenstein and Salant 
(1999) 
Both   V  HS SA SA HS Yes 1 No CP/M and DOS  
Gandal, Kende and Rob (2000) Both   V  HIB SA SA HIB No 1 No CD 
Gupta, Sachin and Sawhney (1999) Both   V  CD CR SA CD No 1 No Television  
Hartman and Teece (1990) Demand  V   HMS  HMS, 
HIB 
 Yes 1 No Minicomputer 
LeNagard-Assayag and Manceau 
(2001) 
Both   V  HIB SA SA HIB No 1 Yes CD (France) 
Nair, Chintagunta, Dube (2004) Both   V  HS SA SA HIB No 1 No PDA 
Ohashi (2003) Demand   V  HMS  HIB  Yes 1 No VCR 
Park (2004) Demand   V  HMS  HMS, 
HIB 
 Yes 1 No VCR 
Rysman (2004) Both   V  CD SP SA CD No 1 No Yellow Pages 
Saloner and Shepherd (1995) Supply    V  SD  HS Yes 1 No ATM 
Shankar and Bayus (2003) Demand   V  HS  HIB  No 1 No Video Game Console 
Shurmer (1993) Demand  V   CD  SA  No 1 No PC Sofware (UK) 
This Study Both   V  HS SA SA HIB No 9 Yes 
B&WTV, CD, CD-
ROM, CTV, DVD, GB, 
i-Mode, Internet, LD 
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Table 2:  
Overview of Non-Empirical Literature on Indirect Network Effects 
 
Definition of Indirect Network Effects Dependent Variable Model Independent Variable Model  Main 
Focus* 
Method** 
Demand-
side 
Supply-side Both Other Hardware*** Software*** Hardware*** Software*** 
Bental and Spiegel (1995) NE C  V       
Bonardi and Durand (2003) NE C   V      
Caillaud and Jullien (2003) INE M   V  CU CP SA HMS 
Choi (1994) NE C V        
Chou and Shy (1990) INE M V    CU CP SA SA 
Chou and Shy (1993) INE M V    CU SA SA HMS 
Chou and Shy (1996) INE M V    CU SA SA HIB 
Church and Gandal (1992a) INE M V    CU CP SA SA 
Church and Gandal (1992b) INE M V    CU CP SA HMS 
Church and Gandal (1993) INE M   V  CU SE SA HIB 
Church and Gandal (1996) INE M   V  CU CP SA SA 
Clark and Chatterjee (1999) NE M   V  CU  SA  
Clements (2004) NE M   V   SE  HIB 
Conner (1995) NE C V        
Dhebar (1995) INE C   V      
Economides (1996) INE C    V     
Economides and Himmelberg (1995) NE C V        
Economides and White (1994) NE C    V     
Esser and Leruth (1988) NE C V        
Farrell and Saloner (1985) NE C  V       
Farrell and Saloner (1986) NE M V    CU  HIB  
Gandal (2002) NE M   V  CU  SA  
Garud and Kumaraswamy (1993) NE C  V       
Hahn (2003) NE C    V     
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Table 2:  
Overview of Non-Empirical Literature on Indirect Network Effects (ctd.) 
*: main focus can be on network effects in general, denoted by NE, indirect network effects, denoted by INE, or other, denoted by O. 
**: method can be conceptual (containing verbal or graphical logic), denoted by C, or mathematical (containing a mathematical formulation), denoted by M. 
*** CU: Consumer Utility, CP: Complementor Profit, HIB: Hardware Installed Base, HMS: Hardware Market Share, SA: Software Availability, SE: Software 
Entry. 
 
 
Definition of Indirect Network Effects Dependent Variable Model Independent Variable Model  Main 
Focus* 
Method** 
Demand-side Supply-side Demand- and Supply-side Other Hardware*** Software*** Hardware*** Software*** 
Hill (1997) O C   V  CU SA SA HIB 
Katz and Shapiro (1985) NE C  V       
Katz and Shapiro (1986a) NE M  V   CU  HIB  
Katz and Shapiro (1986b) NE M  V   CU  HIB  
Katz and Shapiro (1992) NE C  V       
Katz and Shapiro (1994) INE C  V       
Koski and Kretschmer (2004) NE C   V  CU SA SA HIB 
Kotabe, Sahay and Aulakh (1996) O C   V      
Kristiansen (1996) NE C   V      
Kristiansen (1998) NE C V        
Lee and O’Connor (2003) NE C   V  CU SA SA HIB 
Loch and Huberman (1999) NE C  V       
Matutes and Regibeau (1988) O C  V       
Matutes and Regibeau (1992) O C  V       
Postrel (1990) NE C V        
Rohlfs (2001) NE C   V      
Schilling (1999) O C   V  HIB SA SA HIB 
Schilling (2002) O C   V      
Shapiro and Varian (1998) NE C   V      
Sheremata (2004) NE C   V      
Shy (2001) NE M   V   SA  HIB 
Srinivasan, Lilien and Rangaswamy (2004) NE C   V      
Thum (1994) NE C  V       
Valente (1995) O C V        
Viswanathan (2005) NE C  V       
Wade (1995) NE C   V      
Xie and Sirbu (1995) NE C   V      
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Table 3: 
Takeoff Analysis Results 
  Hardware Sales Software Availability 
Market Introduction 
Year 
Takeoff 
Year 
Time to 
Takeoff 
(in years) 
Software 
Availability 
at Hardware 
Sales 
Takeoff 
Takeoff 
Year 
Time to 
Takeoff 
(in 
years) 
Hardware 
Sales at 
Software 
Availability 
Takeoff 
B&W 
Television 
1939 1947 8 7 stations  
on air 
1948 9 970,000 unit 
sales 
        
Compact 
Disc 
1983 1985 2 5,000 titles 1988 5 770,000 unit 
sales 
        
CD-ROM 1985 1990 5 1,522 titles 1988 3 20,000 unit 
sales 
        
Color 
Television 
1954 1956 2 560 hours  
in color 
1956 2 100,000 unit 
sales 
        
DVD 1997 1999 2 3,084 titles 1999 2 3,095,654 
unit sales 
        
Gameboy 1989 1991 2 156 games 1991 2 4.4 mln unit 
sales 
        
i-Mode 1999 2000 1 10,000 sites 2001 2 23,039,000 
subscribers 
        
Internet 
(WWW) 
1991 1994 3 2,217,000 
hosts 
1995 4 25 mln 
subscribers 
        
Laserdisc 1981 1983 2 649 titles 1985 4 229,012 unit 
sales 
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Table 4: 
Time Series Analysis Results 
 
 Black & White TV Compact Disc CD-ROM Color TV DVD 
 
log( )HtS  log( )
S
tA  log( )HtS  log( )
S
tA  log( )HtS  log( )
S
tA  log( )HtS  log( )
S
tA  log( )HtS  log( )
S
tA  
Intercept 13.38*** 
(4.05) 
-0.71 
(0.62) 
1.40** 
(0.57) 
6.15*** 
(0.38) 
3.10 
(10.21) 
1.41 
(1.62) 
-7.92 
(13.18) 
4.41*** 
(1.00) 
-2.69 
(14.89) 
4.57*** 
(0.42) 
Time 0.00 
(0.07) 
0.17* 
(0.09) 
-0.24*** 
(0.02) 
0.23*** 
(0.02) 
0.97 
(0.58) 
-0.13 
(0.35) 
0.51** 
(0.20) 
0.19*** 
(0.06) 
-0.19 
(0.31) 
0.19*** 
(0.04) 
)log( 1
H
tS −  0.69*** (0.11) 
 0.51*** 
(0.03) 
 -0.09 
(0.11) 
 0.54* 
(0.28) 
 0.58 
(0.44) 
 
)log( 1
S
tA −  -0.39 (0.32) 
0.15 
(0.24) 
0.77*** 
(0.05) 
0.08 
(0.07) 
0.13 
(0.65) 
0.95*** 
(0.25) 
-0.87 
(0.60) 
-0.07 
(0.40) 
0.83 
(0.47) 
0.38* 
(0.18) 
)log( 1
H
tIB −   0.22*** (0.07) 
 0.09* 
(0.05) 
 0.03 
(0.25) 
 0.14 
(0.19) 
 0.01 
(0.10) 
)log( 1
H
tP −  -1.28 (0.87) 
 -0.04 
(0.08) 
 0.54 
(1.37) 
 2.69 
(2.38) 
 0.72 
(1.88) 
 
           
Adj R-squared 0.96 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.91 0.96 0.91 0.92 0.99 0.99 
# observations 11 11 11 11 8 8 11 11 7 7 
***: p < 0.01; **: p < 0.05; *: p < 0.10 (two-sided tests). 
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Table 4: 
Time Series Analysis Results (ctd.) 
 
 Gameboy i-Mode Internet (WWW) Laser Disc 
 
log( )HtS  log( )
S
tA  log( )HtS  log( )
S
tA  log( )HtS  log( )
S
tA  log( )HtS  log( )
S
tA  
Intercept 7.04*** 
(1.88) 
-10.65* 
(5.13) 
51.54 
(46.25) 
1.60*** 
(0.22) 
-60.16 
(50.58) 
-0.43 
(1.92) 
-4.69 
(4.90) 
0.33 
(0.69) 
Time 0.13*** 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.30 
(1.70) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.36 
(0.48) 
0.17 
(0.11) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.13*** 
(0.03) 
)log( 1
H
tS −  0.66** (0.26) 
 -0.25 
(2.08) 
 0.86* 
(0.48) 
 0.47* 
(0.23) 
 
)log( 1
S
tA −  -0.42** (0.18) 
-0.32 
(0.24) 
3.95 
(20.99) 
0.74 
(0.69) 
1.34 
(1.25) 
-0.04 
(0.41) 
0.30 
(0.30) 
-0.28 
(0.25) 
)log( 1
H
tIB −   1.11** (0.41) 
 -0.06 
(0.09) 
 0.96** 
(0.36) 
 0.70*** 
(0.19) 
)log( 1
H
tP −  -0.13 (0.61) 
 -4.11 
(4.21) 
 8.57 
(6.94) 
 0.75 
(0.43) 
 
         
Adj R-squared 0.77 0.99 0.82 0.98 0.75 0.99 0.99 0.99 
# observations 15 15 6 6 11 11 9 9 
***: p < 0.01; **: p < 0.05; *: p < 0.10 (two-sided tests). 
  37
Figure 1: 
Graphical Illustration of the Sample 
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Legend: 
The full lines with squares indicate hardware unit sales. Dashed lines with diamonds indicate software 
availability. Dotted lines with triangles indicate the hardware price evolution. 
A full arrow indicates hardware sales takeoff. A dashed arrow indicates software availability takeoff. 
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Figure 2: 
Graphical Overview of Empirical Model 
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Figure 3: 
Indirect Network Effects in Nine Markets 
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Appendix: Data 
Network Market Series Operationalization Time Period Country Data source 
Hardware Sales Retail Unit Sales of B&W Television Sets to Consumers 1946-1957 U.S. The Broadcasting Yearbook 
B&W Television 
Hardware Installed Base Cumulative Retail Unit Sales of B&W Television Sets to Consumers 1946-1957 U.S. Own derivation 
 Hardware Price Average Price of B&WTV Set 1946-1957 U.S. eBrain Market Research 
 Software Availability Number of TV Stations on Air 1945-1957 U.S. The Broadcasting Yearbook and FCC 
  
Hardware Sales Retail Unit Sales of Compact Disc Players to Consumers 1983-1994 U.K. Philips Consumer Electronics 
Compact Disc 
Hardware Installed Base Cumulative Retail Unit Sales of Compact Disc Players to Consumers 1983-1994 U.K. Own derivation 
 Hardware Price Average Price of CD Player 1983-1994 U.S. eBrain Market Research 
 Software Availability Number of Compact Disc Titles in Catalog 1983-1994 U.K. The British Phonographic Industry Ltd  
  
Hardware Sales Retail Unit Sales of CD-ROM Drives to Consumers 1985-1993 U.S. Peter Golder 
CD-ROM 
Hardware Installed Base Cumulative Retail Unit Sales of CD-ROM Drives to Consumers 1985-1993 U.S. Own derivation 
 Hardware Price Average Price of CD-ROM Drive 1985-1993 U.S. Peter Golder 
 Software Availability Number of CD-ROM Titles in Catalog 1985-1993 U.S. CD-ROM Directory 
  
Hardware Sales Retail Unit Sales of Color Television Sets to Consumers 1954-1965 U.S. Consumer Electronics Association 
Color Television 
Hardware Installed Base Cumulative Retail Unit Sales of Color Television Sets to Consumers 1954-1965 U.S. Own derivation 
 Hardware Price Average Price of Color TV Set 1954-1965 U.S. eBrain Market Research 
 Software Availability Number of Hours Broadcasted in Color (all stations) 1954-1965 U.S. Ducey and Fratrik (1989) 
  
Hardware Sales Number of DVD Players Shipped to Dealers 1997-2004 U.S. Consumer Electronics Association 
DVD 
Hardware Installed Base Cumulative Number of DVD Players Shipped to Dealers 1997-2004 U.S. Own derivation 
 Hardware Price Average Price of DVD Player 1997-2004 U.S. eBrain Market Research 
 Software Availability Number of DVD Titles in Catalog 1997-2004 U.S. http://www.hometheaterinfo.com/ 
  
Hardware Sales Retail Unit Sales of Gameboy to Consumers 1989-2004 U.S. NPD 
Gameboy 
Hardware Installed Base Cumulative Retail Unit Sales of Gameboy to Consumers 1989-2004 U.S. Own derivation 
 Hardware Price Average Price of Gameboy Player 1989-2002 U.S. NPD and Nintendo 
 Software Availability Number of Gameboy Games Available to Consumers 1989-2003 U.S. Nintendo 
  
Hardware Sales Number of New i-Mode Subscribers 1999-2005 Japan Own derivation 
i-Mode8 
Hardware Installed Base Total Number of i-Mode Subscribers 1999-2005 Japan NTT DoCoMo 
                                                     
8 i-Mode is a high-speed mobile Internet service (2.5G) introduced first in Japan by NTT DoCoMo. 
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 Hardware Price Average Price of Advertised i-Mode Handset 1999-2005 Japan Ascii24.com 
 Software Availability Number of Independent i-Mode Sites 1999-2005 Japan OH!NEW i-search (www.ohnew.co.jp) 
  
Hardware Sales Number of Additional Internet (WWW) Users 1991-2002 U.S. Own derivation 
Internet (WWW) 
Hardware Installed Base Total Number of Internet (WWW) Users 1991-2002 U.S. Internet Software Consortium 
 Hardware Price Average Price of (Fax-)Modem  1991-2002 U.S. eBrain Market Research 
 Software Availability Number of Internet (WWW) Hosts 1991-2003 U.S. International Telecommunication Union 
  
Hardware Sales Number of Laserdisc Players Shipped to Dealers 1981-1990 Japan Philips Consumer Electronics 
Laserdisc 
Hardware Installed Base Cumulative Number of Laserdisc Players Shipped to Dealers 1981-1990 Japan Own derivation 
 Hardware Price Average Manufacturer Suggested Retail Price of in year t released Laserdisc Player 1981-1990 Japan Variety of sources 
 Software Availability Number of Laserdisc Titles in Catalog 1981-1990 Japan Philips Consumer Electronics 
Table A1: Detailed overview of the data 
 
 
 
Publications in the Report Series Research∗ in Management 
 
ERIM Research Program: “Marketing” 
 
2007 
 
Marketing Communication Drivers of Adoption Timing of a New E-Service Among Existing Customers 
Remco Prins and Peter C. Verhoef 
ERS-2007-018-MKT 
 
 
Indirect Network Effects in New Product Growth 
Stefan Stremersch, Gerard J. Tellis, Philip Hans Franses and Jeroen L.G. Binken 
ERS-2007-019-MKT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
∗  A complete overview of the ERIM Report Series Research in Management: 
https://ep.eur.nl/handle/1765/1
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